Jonas Franken, research associate at the PEASEC research group of TU Darmstadt was recently featured in two international media reports discussing the security of submarine communication cables amid escalating tensions in the Strait of Hormuz. Following statements of Iranian officials on considering to impose fees on international technology companies for the use of subsea cables crossing the Strait, Franken shared his expertise in interviews with France 24 and the Neue Zürcher Zeitung (NZZ).

The interviews draw on PEASEC’s ongoing research on the governance, security and resilience of submarine cable infrastructure in an increasingly contested geopolitical environment.

File:France 24 logo (2013).svg - WikipediaIn an interview with France 24, Franken explained that Iran’s legal and practical control over the cables is more limited than public discussions or Iranian statements suggest. While several international cables cross the Strait of Hormuz, “only two of them are within Iranian territorial waters – Falcon and Gulf Bridge International,” he noted. He also pointed out that any deliberate attempt to sabotage the cables would be technically demanding as, in contrast to the Baltic Sea, “the seabed in the Strait is sandy and muddy, which is perfect for burying cables.” Such sabotage operations would also be highly visible: vessels attempting to damage submarine cables would be “easy to spot and could be targeted by the US.”

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The Neue Zürcher Zeitung likewise featured Franken’s analysis of the technical and geopolitical challenges surrounding submarine cable security. He explained that Iran would have little incentive to damage the two cables located in its own territorial waters because they are also essential for the country’s internet connectivity, which especially the Iranian elites use despite the Blackout. Moreover, he highlighted that the greater strategic risk lies not necessarily in the short-term issue of cables cuts, but in potentially obstructing long-term maintenance operations or seeking greater influence over future cable deployments through its territorial waters.

Read the media coverage:

Related research:

The interviews build on PEASEC’s ongoing work on submarine cable security, including research conducted within the SecFOCI project and the ATHENE Think Tank “Security Risks for Submarine Cables.”

See also:

  • Jonas Franken, Patrick Flamm, Christian Reuter (2026) Subsea cables to Antarctica: Technological challenges and geopolitical implications of connecting the material internet’s last frontier, Telematics and Informatics Reports; 22:100329. doi:10.1016/j.teler.2026.100329
  • Jonas Franken, Martin Hagemeier, Timon Dörnfeld, Julian Löffler, Paula Meissner, Christian Reuter (2026) SubSeaCure: Grid-Based Risk Mapping of Europe’s Subsea Data Cable Network, Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security (SAFECOMP) .
  • Jonas Franken, Thomas Reinhold, Timon Dörnfeld, Christian Reuter (2025) Hidden structures of a global infrastructure: Expansion factors of the subsea data cable network, Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Volume 215, 124068, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2025.124068.
  • Jonas Franken, Christian Reuter (2024) The Subsea Data Cable Security Map – Fusing Public Information for Enhanced Critical Maritime Infrastructure Security (2024), MARESEC 2024, 10.5281/zenodo.14216269

 

Tensions around subsea cables in the Strait of Hormuz – PEASEC research featured by France24 and NZZ
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