Masterarbeit im Studiengang IT-Sicherheit von Andre Hanke: Securing Cryptography in the Quantum Era: An Analysis of Threats and Post-Quantum Solution

Einstein famously described quantum phenomena as „spukhafte Fernwirkung“—spooky action at a distance—a concept that challenged classical understanding. While, these same quantum principles have the potential to propel us into a new computational era, promising unprecedented processing power, they also pose a significant threat to cryptographic systems should a sufficiently large quantum computer be built. Algorithms like Shor’s and Grover’s threaten to break the mathematical foundations of current encryption methods such as RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography. While it’s uncertain when quantum computers capable of this will be realized—possibly decades in the future—findings suggest that this risk to data is already present. There is a rising suspicion that adversaries are intercepting encrypted data today to decrypt it once quantum computing matures, thereby jeopardizing sensitive information requiring long-term confidentiality. The development of quantum-resistant cryptography is crucial to counter this threat, with the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) leading efforts through their Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization process. Although this process finally bore fruit after eight years with the release of the first three standards in 2024, findings further suggest a misconception regarding the perceived urgency of this migration. Despite significant progress in researching and standardizing quantum-resistant algorithms, the threat posed by potential quantum attacks seems to be underestimated. Widespread adoption is expected to take years due to the need for careful deprecation of existing algorithms and extensive public-private engagement. Additionally, the historically lengthy process of even much less complex cryptographic migrations means that real-world implementation may be too slow and does not account for the immediate problem of data harvesting attacks. This thesis underscores the urgent need to accelerate the global adoption of post-quantum cryptographic measures to safeguard digital infrastructures against the emerging and immediate quantum threat.

Betreuer: Dr. Thomas Reinold
Prüfer: Prof. Dr. Dr. Christian Reuter